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DISHONEST ETHICAL ADVOCACY?:  
FALSE DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL COURT 
Joshua A. Liebman* 
 
Up to this morning I believed most firmly in his innocence; and so did 
many others as well as myself. 
“I have sent for you, gentlemen,” said he, “to tell you I committed the 
murder!” 
When I could speak, which was not immediately, I said “Of course, then, 
you are going to plead guilty?” 
“No, sir,” was the reply, “I expect you to defend me to the utmost.” 
We returned to our seats.1 
 
Whatever the torments of his private morality, the lawyer has got to know 
what the law of the land requires.2 
 
Our criminal justice system aims to acquit the innocent and convict the 
guilty.  To facilitate these just outcomes, attorney ethics rules require 
criminal defense attorneys to defend clients with the utmost loyalty and zeal 
while taking care never to engage in dishonesty, fraud, or 
misrepresentation.  When a defense attorney knows a client is guilty, these 
competing ethical duties present a dilemma:  How and when, if at all, do 
the rules of professional conduct permit or even require an attorney 
knowingly to defend a guilty client? 
This Note examines this dilemma and recent judicial approaches to it.  
Judges disagree about how guilty criminal defendants should be permitted 
to mount defenses at trial.  Some have forbidden defense counsel from 
knowingly advancing any false exculpatory proposition.  Others have 
permitted guilty defense attorneys to present sincere or truthful testimony in 
order to bolster a falsehood.  And still others have signaled more general 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Columbia 
University.  I am grateful for Professor Bruce Green’s patient guidance and the Law Review 
staff’s fastidious diligence throughout this project.  Most of all, I am grateful for my family’s 
unconditional support. 
 
 1. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 133 (1973) (quoting SAMUEL 
WARREN & CHARLES PHILLIPS, CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SAMUEL WARREN, ESQ., 
BARRISTER-AT-LAW, AND CHARLES PHILLIPS, ESQ., RELATIVE TO THE TRIAL OF COURVOISIER 
11 (1849)). 
 2. Id. at 158. 
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comfort with the idea that an attorney aggressively can pursue an acquittal 
on behalf of a guilty client. 
This Note seeks to resolve this issue by parsing the range of false defense 
tactics available to attorneys and evaluating the propriety of each under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  This Note reads the Model Rules in 
the context of the adversary system’s twin aims to seek truth and safeguard 
individual rights; it defines and categorizes specific false defense tactics; 
and it offers practical, context-specific recommendations to courts and 
attorneys evaluating knowingly false defenses as they occur in the real 
world. 
Rather than accepting or rejecting false defenses wholesale, this Note 
argues that the best reading of the Model Rules permits some false defense 
tactics and prohibits others.  Specifically, this Note distinguishes false 
defenses that adduce or rely on evidence known to be false from others that 
do not:  the former violate the Model Rules, while the latter comport with 
them and facilitate the adversary system’s proper function.  This distinction 
accounts for important ethical differences between false defense tactics and 
provides a workable, practical framework through which courts can 
determine precisely how and when defense counsel should be allowed to 
advocate on behalf of a guilty client. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a criminal defense attorney representing a client facing 
the death penalty for murder.3  During the course of representation, you 
have come to know that your client is guilty of shooting and killing the 
victim in broad daylight at point-blank range:  he credibly admitted guilt to 
you during a privileged and confidential conversation.  Your duties 
competently and diligently to represent your client and to keep your client’s 
confidences4 require that you pursue the best possible outcome on his 
behalf—if possible, an acquittal.  Yet you also seek to honor your duties of 
candor to the court and fairness to the prosecution, which forbid you from 
making or introducing false statements or evidence in court.5 
You contemplate your options on the eve of trial.  Can you ethically and 
permissibly stand before the judge and jury and argue that your guilty client 
did not, in fact, commit the crime?  Can you call to the witness stand an 
expert to sincerely but incorrectly testify that your client was not the person 
seen on video committing capital murder, even though you know your 
client is guilty?  Can you argue or present evidence suggesting that an 
innocent third party pulled the trigger?  Or are you ethically constrained 
merely to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses or, after hearing the 
government’s case, only to argue to the jury that the prosecution has failed 
to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?  At what point, and 
under what circumstances, do these forms of zealous advocacy transform 
into instances of professional misconduct? 
Professor Harry I. Subin defined a false defense as a “means attempting 
to convince the judge or jury that facts established by the state and known 
to the attorney to be true are not true, or that facts known to the attorney to 
 
 3. The following hypothetical is adapted from the facts of United States v. Jiménez-
Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 9–14 (1st Cir. 2015).  For discussion and analysis of that case, see infra 
Part III.C. 
 4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client.”); id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client’s behalf.”); id. r. 1.6 (discussing attorney-client confidentiality). 
 5. See id. r. 3.3 (discussing attorneys’ duty of candor to the courts); id. r. 3.4 
(discussing attorneys’ duty of fairness to opposing parties and opposing counsel). 
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be false are true.”6  The dilemma presented by such defenses, especially 
when made by a lawyer who knows a client is guilty, predates the American 
legal system and has plagued attorneys, ethicists, and legal scholars alike 
throughout Anglo-American legal history.7  Writing in 1892, George D. 
Watrous lamented that “[n]o problem in professional ethics has more 
thoroughly distracted the conscientious student, and none is more 
responsible for the ignorant and contemptuous opinion which really prevails 
among many laymen, that no lawyer can be an honest man or that no honest 
man can become a lawyer.”8  At the turn of the twentieth century, Louis J. 
Rosenberg noted that “the status of the attorney to his guilty client[] is not 
infrequently a matter causing him much perplexity.”9  Indeed, the earliest 
American legal ethics treatises dedicated whole sections to defense ethics, 
attorney candor, and related topics.10  These treatises aired both sides of the 
debate:  opinions ran the gamut from advocating for unbridled zealous 
advocacy11 to arguing that guilty defendants deserved either the barest 
defense or no defense at all.12  While recent decades have seen increasing 
 
 6. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”:  Reflections on the 
“Right” to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987). But see John B. 
Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them:  A Response to Professor Subin’s 
Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987) 
(critiquing Subin’s definition of false defenses and his proposed answers to whether and 
when false defenses should be allowed).  
 7. See, e.g., MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 141–45 (citing English letters and newspaper 
articles dating to 1840 debating this topic). 
 8. George D. Watrous, The Moral Right to Defend the Guilty, 2 YALE L.J. 41, 44 
(1892). 
 9. Louis J. Rosenberg, The Status of an Attorney Defending a Guilty Client, 10 YALE 
L.J. 24, 24 (1900). 
 10. See, e.g., HERSCHEL WHITFIELD ARANT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE 
AMERICAN BAR AND ITS ETHICS 234–58, 422–500 (1933); ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM, CASES 
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 215–66 (1st ed. 1938); GEORGE P. 
COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS 181–203 (1st ed. 1917); 
GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 128–44 (1st ed. 1902). 
 11. See, e.g., CHEATHAM, supra note 10, at 194  (“A lawyer has no business with the 
justice or injustice of the cause which he undertakes . . . .  The justice or injustice of the 
cause is to be decided by the judge.” (quoting Note, Dr. Johnson and the Law, 29 CAN. L. 
TIMES 1021, 1021 (1909)); COSTIGAN, JR., supra note 10, at 320 (quoting a nineteenth-
century defense attorney who argued that if defense attorneys violated clients’ confidences 
by revealing knowledge of clients’ guilt, “the relation of client and counsel will be deranged, 
and their mutual confidence interrupted; the independence of the bar will be violated, and the 
principle of advocacy will be abolished altogether”); WARVELLE, supra note 10, at 136 
(“Before the law all men are equal, and guilty men have the same right to be defended and to 
be represented by counsel as have the innocent.”); see also id., at 137 (derisively labeling as 
“pseudo-moralists” those who criticized zealous defenders of the guilty). 
 12. See, e.g., CHEATHAM, supra note 10, at 197 (“No lawyer can work for the acquittal 
of a client who has confessed to him his guilt . . . without ceasing to be professional and 
ethical; nor can he, if such be his practice, assert himself to be an apostle of ‘law and order.’” 
(quoting CARL F. TAEUSCH, PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS 64–66 (1926)); COSTIGAN, 
JR., supra note 10, at 318–19 (“[I]f an accused person be really guilty, he has no moral right 
to any defense.  In him, any attempt to avoid punishment by a deception . . . is an additional 
crime, instead of a justifiable act; and how can it be a virtue in his counsel to do that for him 
which is a crime if done by himself?” (quoting Editorial, 4 JURIST 593, 594 (1840))); 
WARVELLE, supra note 10, at 134–35 (“[I]n the minds of many, [knowingly defending a 
guilty client] is the depth of professional infamy, and a lawyer who will so far lower himself 
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acceptance of the idea that false defenses can be ethical or even desirable,13 
theorists continue in search of a final resolution to the false-defense 
dilemma.14 
While this intellectual debate has continued to simmer, some courts have 
faced circumstances requiring concrete, real-world determinations of what 
attorneys confronting the false-defense dilemma should be permitted to do 
in court.15  In this context, judges have interpreted and applied rules 
governing attorney conduct to fact-specific circumstances in which a 
defendant’s liberty often hangs in the balance.16  Perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the tenor of the scholarly discourse surrounding this topic, judicial 
decisions addressing knowingly false defenses conflict and often beg the 
question.  Some courts have interpreted rules of professional conduct to 
forbid all false defenses by which an attorney affirmatively advances any 
proposition contrary to her client’s guilt.17  Yet the First Circuit recently 
suggested that false defenses based on properly admitted evidence may be 
permissible,18 and the Second Circuit sharply divided on the question of 
whether, how, and when to allow a guilty criminal defendant to try to 
convince a jury of his innocence.19 
This Note argues that most of these courts’ analyses are misguided, 
overly simplistic, or both, and it advocates for more nuanced judicial 
analysis of false defenses’ ethical propriety.  In short, it concludes that the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Model Rules”) are best read to 
permit some false defense tactics and to prohibit others.  Courts should 
distinguish tactics that deliberately yield or rely on false evidence from 
tactics that do not.  The former—i.e., knowingly proffering or making use 
of false evidence—violate the Model Rules and undermine the adversary 
criminal process, while the latter—advancing false conclusions drawn from 
evidence properly before the finder of fact—both comport with the Model 
Rules and work to ensure our criminal process’s proper function.  This Note 
applies this distinction to the variety of trial circumstances in which defense 
counsel might employ a false defense; it presents arguments for and against 
judges permitting false defenses in each of these circumstances; and it 
recommends a specific approach to each of these scenarios. 
 
as to . . . continue in a case after such knowledge has been brought home to him, is regarded 
as utterly depraved and destitute of moral feeling.”).  
 13. For a seminal work advancing this position, see generally Monroe H. Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:  The Three Hardest Questions, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (arguing that a defense attorney should not hesitate to 
zealously cross-examine truthful witnesses, should be permitted to call to the stand a client 
who intends to testify falsely, and ethically may give legal advice to a client even when 
doing so will tempt the client to commit perjury). 
 14. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?:  The Law and 
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1652 (2000). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. See infra Part III.D. 
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Part I introduces the underlying ethical responsibilities, rules, and 
concepts relevant to this discussion.  It discusses defense attorneys’ 
competing roles as zealous advocates and officers of the court.  It then 
introduces competing understandings of the adversary criminal process as 
motivated by truth seeking on one hand and safeguarding individual rights 
on the other.  These dueling motivations mirror the defense attorney’s dual 
ethical roles and should inform analyses of false defenses in the criminal 
context. 
Part II sets forth five varieties of false defense tactics that defense 
counsel might seek to employ:  putting the government to its proof, drawing 
false inferences or advancing alternate theories, arguing actual innocence, 
blame shifting, and eliciting perjury or knowingly submitting false 
evidence.  Part II defines each of these tactics and sets forth the specific 
ethical questions and challenges each presents. 
Part III describes four recent cases in which federal courts have grappled 
with the ethics of knowingly false defenses.  These cases tend to reveal 
judicial hesitancy to permit false defenses.  Several suffer from 
unsophisticated analyses of both the variety of false defense tactics and the 
varied circumstances in which they may be employed. 
Finally, Part IV distinguishes false defenses that adduce or rely on 
evidence known to be false from those that are advanced through legal 
arguments.  Contextualizing and examining specific false defense tactics in 
turn, Part IV sets forth and weighs the ethical considerations relevant to 
them and recommends a judicial approach to each.  It begins with the easy 
boundary cases:  putting the government to its proof always is allowed, and 
eliciting perjury or knowingly submitting false evidence never is allowed.  
Part IV then delves into the more challenging instances in which the false-
defense dilemma may arise in practice. 
By parsing false defenses in this way, this Note strives to offer useful 
practical guidance to attorneys and judges faced with the prospect of 
employing or ruling on false defenses.  Further, by considering these 
defenses as they occur in the real world, this inquiry sheds new light on the 
normative debate over the criminal advocate’s ideal balance between 
loyalty to clients and loyalty to truth. 
I.  CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS AND ADVERSARY THEORY 
Criminal defense attorneys necessarily occupy a unique—and uniquely 
challenging—ethical position.20  They principally serve as advocates by 
pursuing the most favorable outcomes possible for their clients.21  Yet they 
also function as “officers of the court” charged with upholding the integrity 
of the courts and the criminal process.22  This part introduces these often 
 
 20. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Judicial Rhetoric and Lawyers’ Roles, 90 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1989, 1997–98 (2015) (explaining that criminal defense attorneys’ duties to clients 
often take precedence over their other ethical responsibilities). 
 21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also 
infra Part I.B. 
 22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2; see also infra Part I.A.2. 
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competing responsibilities23 in the context of criminal advocacy, as well as 
the Model Rules24 that govern defense counsel’s approaches to them.  This 
part then links these dual ethical responsibilities with two underlying and 
often conflicting animating purposes of the adversary criminal process:  
arriving at the truth25 and safeguarding individual rights.26  The Model 
Rules’ requirements, restrictions, and guidance regarding false defenses are 
best understood when read in the context of these twin systemic aims, 
which find themselves directly and unavoidably at odds in the false defense 
context.27 
A.  The Defense Attorney as Zealous Advocate 
 This section sets forth defense attorneys’ ethical duties as zealous 
advocates for their clients. 
1.  Diligence and Zeal 
Like all attorneys, criminal defense counsel must “act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”28  This mandate 
contemplates “whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”29  In addition to diligence in tactics, 
the Model Rules instruct defense attorneys to bear an attitude of 
commitment, dedication, and zeal toward both their clients’ interests and 
their own efforts to realize them.30  One apt and well-known gloss on this 
duty of zealous advocacy comes from the distinguished nineteenth-century 
English attorney Lord Henry Brougham, who described it during the 
notorious 1820 English trial known as Queen Caroline’s Case: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all 
the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means 
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst 
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he 
 
 23. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 
DUKE L.J. 921, 922–25 (describing the persistent problem of locating a proper balance 
between these two responsibilities). 
 24. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are promulgated by the American Bar 
Association and inform the standards of professional conduct enacted by the vast majority of 
U.S. jurisdictions. See States Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  Dates of Adoption, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting
_model_rules.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K8QA-W2B3]. 
 25. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 26. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 27. Cf. Pye, supra note 23, at 924–25 (arguing that defense attorneys’ dual roles are best 
balanced “by examining the purposes of the criminal process and the degree to which 
different defense tactics contribute to or impede the achievement of those purposes”). 
 28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); accord 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
standard 4-1.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“Defense counsel should act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 30. Id. 
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must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may 
bring upon others.31 
In short, the ethical defense attorney demonstrates undivided loyalty to 
her client and strives to achieve her client’s goals to the fullest possible 
extent. 
2.  Confidentiality 
In addition to zeal, confidentiality and full disclosure also are central to 
the attorney-client relationship.  An attorney must keep clients’ confidences 
by not revealing any “information relating to the representation of a client” 
without first obtaining the client’s informed consent.32  Confidentiality long 
has been recognized as a fundamental legal ethical duty.33  Indeed, the 
current iteration of the Model Rules marks confidentiality as a 
“fundamental principle . . . [that] contributes to the trust that is the hallmark 
of the client-lawyer relationship.”34  Without the protection offered by 
attorney-client confidentiality, a client might withhold relevant information 
from his attorney for fear of saying something that later could be used 
against him, hampering his attorney from mounting the best possible 
defense—and potentially depriving the client of sound legal advice that 
only a well-informed attorney could provide.35 
B.  The Defense Attorney as Officer of the Court 
In addition to serving as zealous advocates, defense attorneys bear the 
responsibility of acting as “officers of the court.”36  As such, the Model 
 
 31. TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE:  PART II, at 3 (N.Y., James Cockcroft & Co. 1874); see 
also id. at 1649 n.18 (collecting references in the criminal ethics literature to this famous 
quotation). 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.1 (describing 
defense attorneys’ duty of confidentiality to their clients).  Attorneys also must make 
reasonable efforts to avoid unintentional or unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c). But see id. r. 1.6(b) (establishing 
seven exceptions to the duty of confidentiality). 
 33. See, e.g., Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confidences:  Punishing the 
Innocent, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 186–87, 189–90 (1990) (tracing the origins of American 
attorney-client confidentiality to eighteenth-century English law and noting that the 
American Bar Association’s original ethics canons forbade attorneys from disclosing client 
confidences); Brandon P. Ruben, Note, Should the Medium Affect the Message?:  Legal and 
Ethical Implications of Prosecutors Reading Inmate-Attorney Email, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2131, 2140 (2015). 
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2.  
 35. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978); see also, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.1(a) (“Defense 
counsel should explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts known to the client for an 
effective defense, and defense counsel should explain the extent to which counsel’s 
obligation of confidentiality makes privileged the accused’s disclosures.”); id. standard 4-
3.2(a)–(b) (instructing defense counsel to interview clients to “determine all relevant facts 
known to the accused” and that, in so doing, defense counsel should not suggest that the 
client not be candid). 
 36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2. 
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Rules require that they “avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process,”37 a category that includes knowingly making a false 
statement of fact or law in court38 or knowingly offering false evidence.39  
A defense attorney also may not act unfairly toward an adversary by, 
among other things, falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness 
to offer false testimony.40  These proscriptions accord with the Model 
Rules’ general admonition that an attorney must not “commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as 
a lawyer in other respects”41 or, more generally still, to refrain from 
“conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”42 
Defense attorneys therefore must maintain a delicate balance.  The Model 
Rules require that they advocate fiercely on each client’s behalf, but they 
must never advocate too fiercely by engaging in behavior or tactics that 
impede, discredit, or derail the criminal process. 
C.  Truth Versus Rights?:  
Two Goals of the Adversary System 
The adversary criminal process itself synthesizes competing goals that 
parallel the criminal defense advocate’s twin responsibilities to the client 
and to truth.  Scholars who seek to account for the aims of the American 
criminal justice system emphasize a wide range of animating purposes, 
including truth seeking, affording procedural fairness, minimizing the 
incidence of factually inaccurate verdicts, safeguarding individual rights, 
enforcing and reasserting societal values and norms, advancing defendants’ 
dignity and autonomy, and incentivizing parties to negotiate settlements or 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. r. 3.3(a); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.2(f) (“Defense counsel should not intentionally 
misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court.”). 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-7.5(a) (“Defense 
counsel should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible 
evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to take reasonable remedial measures upon 
discovery of its falsity.”).  Because the Model Rules define knowledge as actual knowledge, 
an attorney can violate these prohibitions only if she subjectively knows that a statement or 
piece of evidence is false. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (also noting that 
actual knowledge “may be inferred from circumstances” and so need not be proven by direct 
evidence). 
 40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-7.5(a) (“Defense 
counsel should not knowingly offer false . . . testimony of witnesses, or fail to take 
reasonable remedial measures upon discovery of its falsity.”); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, 
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-3.7(b) (“Defense 
counsel should not counsel a client in or knowingly assist a client to engage in conduct 
which defense counsel knows to be illegal or fraudulent but defense counsel may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client.”). 
 41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b). 
 42. Id. r. 8.4(d). 
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pleas.43  This section highlights two of these systemic aims that are of 
especial relevance to the false-defense dilemma:  arriving at the truth and 
safeguarding individual rights.  This section discusses competing 
understandings of the adversary process that focus on one of these goals 
and then sets forth the implications of these views in the context of the 
false-defense dilemma. 
1.  Arriving at the Truth 
One principal goal of the criminal process is, of course, to arrive at the 
truth—in other words, to determine whether the defendant actually 
committed the crime or crimes charged.44  From this perspective, then, the 
criminal justice system’s adversarial structure should be understood as a 
means to uncovering what actually happened.45  Assigning zealous 
advocates to the prosecution and defense ensures that both sides’ strongest 
arguments will be made at trial, best positioning the fact-finder to assess a 
defendant’s guilt.46  By its terms, this normative framework values rules, 
standards, and procedures governing criminal procedure that facilitate truth 
seeking; and its enthusiasts view rules, standards, and procedures that serve 
to obfuscate the truth as antithetical to the criminal justice system’s 
principal goal.47 
Focusing now on criminal defense counsel, those who prioritize the 
criminal process’s truth-seeking function would favor constraints on 
defense attorneys that (they believe) aid the criminal process in its mission 
 
 43. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987); see also Suni, supra note 14, at 1650–51, 1651 n.23.  
For an introduction to the adversary theory literature, see Goodpaster, supra, at 118 n.1 
(collecting seminal works in the field and notable scholarly responses to them). 
 44. E.g., Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False Look True, 
41 SW. L.J. 1135, 1138 (1988) (“[T]hat the objective of a trial under the adversary system is 
the determination of truth would on its face seem unexceptionable if not self-evident.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1975) (“It is said, commonly by judges, that ‘[t]he basic purpose of a 
trial is the determination of truth.’” (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 
406, 416 (1966) (alteration in original))); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy 
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (1966) (“[T]he advocate 
plays his role well when zeal for his client’s cause promotes a wise and informed decision of 
the case.” (quoting Professional Responsibility:  Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. 
J. 1159, 1160–61 (1958))); Pye, supra note 23, at 926 (arguing that “[c]onduct that is 
intended to, or is likely to, result in the suppression of truth, or which is designed to mislead 
a court or jury or to facilitate a falsehood, should be presumptively improper” because 
“objectives of the system [other than truth seeking] must themselves be re-examined if in 
concert they preclude the ascertainment of truth”). 
 46. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 43, at 121 (describing the view that “[t]ruth is best 
discovered by powerful statements on both sides of a question” (quoting United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (alteration in original))). But see, e.g., MELLINKOFF, supra 
note 1, at 4 (asserting that “[w]e assume or pretend that a system of justice is nothing more 
than a search for the truth despite abundant evidence around us and inside us that points in 
another direction”); Frankel, supra note 45, at 1036 (questioning whether the adversary 
system is as effective at truth seeking as commonly believed). 
 47. See, e.g., Noonan, Jr., supra note 45, at 1486–87 (“[T]he advocate plays his role well 
when zeal for his client’s cause promotes a wise and informed decision of the case.” (quoting 
Professional Responsibility:  Report of the Join Conference, supra note 45, at 1160–61)). 
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to uncover the truth.  If truth seeking were the criminal justice system’s sole 
mission, a defense attorney who knew her client was guilty would not be 
permitted to employ any defense tactic intended to conceal this truth from 
the jury in hopes of winning an undeserved acquittal.  From the perspective 
of the Model Rules, these constraints would arise from defense counsel’s 
role as an officer of the court,48 which, on this thinking, trump the 
attorney’s responsibility diligently to serve as a guilty client’s zealous 
advocate49:  an attorney who knowingly propounds a false proposition 
impedes truth seeking, and the rules of professional conduct should 
proscribe attorney conduct that undermines this systemic goal.50 
2.  Safeguarding Individual Rights 
A second animating purpose of the criminal justice system is the 
protection of defendants’ individual rights, including the rights of 
defendants who are known by their attorneys to be guilty.51  Legal scholars 
who prioritize this goal commonly emphasize the importance of the 
adversary process in shielding individual rights from government 
overreach.52  By imposing what Professor John B. Mitchell has described as 
a series of “screens” on the government’s prosecutorial power, the criminal 
process ensures that the government imposes punishment only when it can 
prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.53  This positivist, 
normative standard is best understood, according to Mitchell, as “the 
symbol we have chosen to represent th[e] line between societally acceptable 
and unacceptable levels of certainty and doubt in the mind of the fact finder 
 
 48. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 49. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 50. See, e.g., Subin, supra note 6, at 125 (arguing for a rule of professional conduct 
banning defense counsel from attempting to refute a fact established by the prosecution 
when defense counsel knows the fact to be true beyond a reasonable doubt); see also 
Randolph Braccialarghe, Why Were Perry Mason’s Clients Always Innocent?:  The Criminal 
Lawyer’s Moral Dilemma—The Criminal Defendant Who Tells His Lawyer He Is Guilty, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 77 (2004) (arguing that the Model Rules should be amended to forbid 
false defenses on behalf of clients known to be guilty because “[e]fforts by lawyers to secure 
the acquittal of the guilty do not benefit the law abiding members of society, victims, or even 
the falsely or mistakenly accused; the main beneficiaries are guilty defendants and, to some 
extent, the pocket books of criminal defense lawyers themselves”). But see, e.g., Mitchell, 
supra note 6 (critiquing Subin’s conclusions and arguing that defense attorneys should be 
permitted to advance false interpretations of the prosecution’s evidence); Harry I. Subin, Is 
This Lie Necessary?:  Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 689, 690 (1988) [hereinafter Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?] (responding to 
Mitchell’s critique). 
 51. For an informative introduction to this school of thought, see Suni, supra note 14, at 
1649–51 & nn.17–29. 
 52. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 342; cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search 
for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1064–65 & nn.18–22 (1975) (quoting several U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions recognizing that, as zealous advocates, defense attorneys often 
must engage in conduct that does not promote the truth). 
 53. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 347; see also John Kaplan, Defending Guilty People, 
7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223, 229–34 (1986) (describing this “checking function” by which 
“the criminal process . . . check[s] and regulate[s] its own institutions”). 
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when deciding a criminal case.”54  Unlike a system dedicated to uncovering 
the truth, an adversarial system engineered to protect individual rights more 
readily would permit defense attorneys to challenge the prosecution’s 
evidence by knowingly advancing false propositions.  That rare case in 
which a defense attorney knowingly convinces the fact-finder that the 
government has not proven a guilty defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt serves the invaluable societal function of reinforcing systemic 
constraints on prosecutorial power.55 
To be sure, many legal ethicists and adversarial theorists cannot neatly be 
separated into one or the other of these two categories.  Rather than 
presenting a detailed taxonomy of competing views on the nature of the 
American adversary system, however, this part focuses on truth seeking and 
protecting individual rights because these goals so closely mirror defense 
counsel’s ethical duties as officers of the court and advocates for their 
clients, respectively.  The zealous advocate strives to safeguard her client’s 
individual rights, checking prosecutorial power by fighting for her client to 
the fullest permissible extent.56  The officer of the court maintains the 
integrity of the courts and criminal process by refraining from unfair or 
dishonest practices or knowingly relying on dishonest testimony or false 
evidence, even—and especially—when doing so would benefit her client at 
the expense of the adversary process’s truth-seeking function.57  
Correspondingly, while an ardent truth seeker deplores successful false 
defenses for deliberately transgressing the criminal process’s truth-seeking 
function, a theorist or practitioner prioritizing defendants’ individual rights 
not only finds false defenses desirable but also believes they reify a core 
systemic value. 
II.  FALSE DEFENSES INTRODUCED 
False defenses encompass a wide range of tactics, from affirmatively 
stating that a guilty client is innocent to seeking to undermine truthful 
adverse evidence by more subtle means.58  Bearing in mind the ethical roles 
and systemic aims introduced above,59 this part introduces the range of 
false defense tactics that defense counsel may employ.  This part does so in 
the following order:  first, passively putting the government to its proof; 
second, expounding false inferences drawn from admitted evidence; third, 
falsely asserting a guilty client’s actual innocence of a crime; fourth, 
 
 54. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 343. 
 55. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Reflections on the Ethics of Representing Clients Whose 
Aims Are Unjust, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 55, 57 (1999) (“It is true that acquittal enables the 
criminal to escape just punishment; but his client’s acquittal can be sought by the lawyer for 
other reasons, namely, the preservation of his client’s legal rights and the protection of the 
integrity of the legal process.”). 
 56. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 57. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 58. For an illustration of a less direct false defense, see Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, 
supra note 50, at 691 (juxtaposing and analyzing two hypothetical defense closing 
arguments knowingly made on behalf of a guilty client). 
 59. See supra Part I. 
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shifting blame by falsely suggesting the guilt of a third party; and fifth, 
knowingly introducing false evidence or eliciting false testimony favorable 
to a guilty client’s case.  It is important to note that these five categories 
bleed into one another in practice.60  Nonetheless, this part aims to account 
for all common varieties of false defenses and, by juxtaposing them, to 
convey important differences between these strategies that courts and 
attorneys should consider when evaluating these tactics’ ethical propriety.61 
A.  Putting the Government to Its Proof 
First, a defense attorney puts the government to its proof simply by 
arguing that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In so doing, defense counsel need neither suggest that the defendant 
is innocent nor advance any other false proposition—or, really, set forth any 
affirmative proposition whatsoever.  Indeed, the most passive way to put 
the government to its proof is simply to argue to the jury that the 
prosecution’s case is insufficient to support a conviction.  Defense counsel 
naturally might choose to highlight specific reasons why this is so—for 
example, by highlighting gaps, inconsistencies, or other problems with the 
prosecution’s evidence or theory of the case.  This Note categorizes an 
approach that limits itself merely to observing such deficiencies as putting 
the government to its proof; but it labels the tactic of illustrating such 
deficiencies by arguing specific counterfactuals as drawing false 
inferences.62 
Putting the government to its proof does not require defense counsel to 
convince the fact-finder of a falsehood or to undermine a truthful 
proposition.  Indeed, perhaps for this reason, putting the government to its 
proof always is permitted even on behalf of a client known to be guilty, for 
the prosecution’s duty to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt is meaningless unless defense counsel can argue that this burden has 
not been satisfied.63  For this reason, failing to put the government to its 
proof constitutes a dereliction of zealous advocacy amounting to a violation 
of Model Rule 1.3.64 
 
 60. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 
1759–62 (1993).  
 61. See infra Part IV. 
 62. See infra Part II.B (discussing false inferences). 
 63. E.g., Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 271 (2006) (explaining that “[i]t is universally 
accepted that the defense lawyer can put the government to its proof—a process that could 
well result in a not-guilty verdict if,” for example, “a crucial witness fails to appear or 
testifies poorly or if important physical evidence is unavailable”). 
 64. Suni, supra note 14, at 1653 (“[T]here is no serious dispute that when a defendant 
chooses to go to trial, the criminal defense lawyer has an obligation to represent the 
defendant, whether guilty or not, so as to require the government to meet its constitutionally 
mandated burden of proof.” (footnotes omitted)); see also supra Part I.A.1 (describing the 
duty of zealous advocacy imposed by Model Rule 1.3). 
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B.  Drawing False Inferences 
Second, a defense attorney draws a false inference (or advances an 
alternate theory) when she submits to the fact-finder a false conclusion that 
is drawn or arises from truthful evidence (or, more accurately, evidence or 
testimony not known by defense counsel to be false).  While an attorney 
advancing an alternate theory need not directly make a false statement, the 
goal is to convince the fact-finder of a conclusion that defense counsel 
knows to be false; in other words, “weakening the persuasiveness” of the 
prosecution’s case by raising possibilities favorable to the client.65  
Professor David Luban characterizes this tactic as “[s]uggesting reasonable 
doubts,” which he points out often elides in practice into knowingly 
advancing a false conclusion, impeaching a witness known to be testifying 
truthfully, or “[s]aying things that are literally true but drastically 
misleading.”66  The goal here is to convince the fact-finder that a false 
narrative favorable to the defendant cannot be disproven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by affirmatively pointing out specific ways in which the 
government has failed to prove its case.67 
Some commentators separate false inferences into two categories:  
inferences intended to show how the prosecution has failed to carry its 
burden of proof and inferences “used for their probative value.”68  The 
difference between these two forms of false inference often is subtle.69  As 
an example of the former, consider a defense attorney who argues to the 
jury that, based on the prosecution’s evidence, it cannot be known beyond a 
reasonable doubt whether the (guilty) defendant actually committed the 
crime.70  This form of false inference is widely accepted as an appropriate 
means by which to put the government to its proof because defense counsel 
simply is illustrating with particularity ways in which the prosecution has 
failed to make its case.71 
 
 65. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 346 (emphasis omitted).   
 66. Luban, supra note 60, at 1759–62.  Luban expressed ambivalence as to the propriety 
of these tactics. See id. 
 67. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 346. 
 68. Suni, supra note 14, at 1656 & n.54. But see id. at 1656 n.55 (noting Luban’s 
argument that this distinction “is so artificial that it can never form the basis for drawing the 
magic moral line” (quoting Luban, supra note 60, at 1760–61)). 
 69. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 60, at 1760; see also supra note 68.  However, it should 
be noted that if defense counsel offensively advances a falsehood not supportable by any 
admitted evidence, she may approach advancing the type of false statement banned by 
Model Rule 3.3. See supra Part I.B (introducing and discussing Model Rule 3.3). 
 70. For a more specific counterfactual, see Mitchell, supra note 6, at 345 (offering a 
hypothetical defense closing on behalf of a guilty client that concludes, “So, maybe she did 
[commit the crime].  On the other hand, . . . maybe she didn’t. . . .  The prosecution has the 
burden, and he simply can’t carry any burden let alone ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ with a 
maybe she did, maybe she didn’t case”). But see Subin, Is This Lie Necessary?, supra note 
50, at 691–92 (critiquing Mitchell’s argument and asserting that, while this closing’s 
message is not a lie, “it certainly creates a false impression, which amounts to the same 
thing”). 
 71. Suni, supra note 14, at 1656 & n.55; cf. id. at 1654 n.45 (explaining that juries 
commonly are thought to construct and evaluate the prosecution’s and defense’s competing 
stories of the case and noting that “to a large extent[,] the benefits to a defendant of the 
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The latter form of false inference—one relied upon by defense counsel 
for its purported truth—by its terms seeks to deceptively convince the fact-
finder of its truthfulness.  This tactic is more controversial in the legal 
ethics literature.72  As an example, consider an attorney who exploits a 
deficiency in the prosecution’s evidence by arguing that a truthful 
eyewitness did not actually observe the defendant committing the crime.  
Indeed, in practice this tactic often occurs when a defense attorney subjects 
a truthful witness to dogged cross-examination intended to impugn the 
witness’s credibility.73  Though scholarly minds may differ as to these 
inferences’ ethical propriety, in practice, attorneys are not disciplined for 
propounding them, indicating that doing so most likely does not run afoul 
of the Model Rules.74 
C.  Arguing Actual Innocence 
Third, a defense attorney argues actual innocence by affirmatively 
submitting that a guilty defendant did not actually commit the crime with 
which he has been charged.75  This tactic is best understood as a specific 
variant of false inferences advanced for their purported truthfulness.76  
When a defendant’s guilt is clear, defense counsel can argue actual 
innocence only by introducing or relying upon false evidence, which is an 
approach as plainly impermissible as it is ethically uninteresting.77  Of 
particular relevance to this Note, however, are cases in which a defense 
attorney argues actual innocence by relying on evidence that she does not 
know to be false. 
One oft-cited example of such a defense is found in a Michigan ethics 
opinion offering guidance to a defense attorney preparing to defend at trial a 
client who credibly, privately, and confidentially had admitted guilt.78  This 
devious defendant divulged to his attorney that he had knocked his victim 
unconscious and stolen the victim’s watch so that the victim would have an 
incorrect sense of when the crime occurred.79  Defense counsel wondered if 
he ethically could call as alibi witnesses friends of the defendant who 
truthfully would place the defendant away from the crime scene during the 
time when the victim mistakenly believed the crime took place.80  Noting 
that these alibi witnesses would testify truthfully and that “[o]ne cannot 
suborn the truth,” the ethics committee concluded that the defense attorney 
 
government being required to carry a high burden of proof may be negated unless the 
defense can present its own version of the case”). 
 72. See id. at 1656 & n.54, 1658–59, 1658 nn.62–64. 
 73. Cf. id. at 1657–58 & nn.59–61 (comparing such hostile cross-examination to the 
tactic of shifting blame). 
 74. Id. at 1663 n.91. 
 75. This Note classifies arguments of actual innocence in which defense counsel 
knowingly shifts blame onto an innocent third party as falling within the “blame shifting” 
category of false defenses.  See infra Part II.D for a discussion of that tactic. 
 76. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra Part II.E (discussing perjury and knowingly submitting false evidence). 
 78. Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-1164 (1987). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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ethically could present the false defense.81  Unlike a defense attorney who 
draws a false inference, an attorney arguing actual innocence attempts 
directly and deceptively to convince the jury of her client’s innocence.  
Such an assertion aims squarely to undercut the truth-seeking purpose of a 
criminal trial82 by challenging offensively and falsely the crux of the 
prosecution’s case. 
D.  Shifting Blame 
Fourth, a defense attorney shifts blame by presenting what many refer to 
as the “SODDI” defense:  “Some Other Dude Did It.”83  This tactic can 
include introducing evidence tending to falsely demonstrate another’s 
involvement in or commission of the crime, or, on rare occasion, evidence 
that another party has committed similar crimes in the past.84  One variation 
of this tactic, which Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried refers to as the 
“SODDI defense 2.0,” is to submit evidence showing that the police failed 
diligently to investigate another party who might have committed the 
crime.85  Many commentators view blame shifting on behalf of a client 
whom defense counsel knows to be guilty as especially undesirable because 
of this tactic’s potential to inflict harm on the innocent third party who the 
defense attorney argues is guilty.86  However, Professor Ellen Yankiver 
Suni concludes in her persuasive treatment of the blame-shifting tactic that 
the rules and standards of professional conduct do not prohibit it and in fact 
may even require it when defense counsel is not certain of a client’s guilt.87 
E.  Perjury and Knowingly Submitting False Evidence 
Finally, a defense attorney might knowingly elicit false testimony or 
submit false evidence.  Such tactics are outlawed both by criminal statutes 
and by ethics rules, as they universally are recognized as detrimental to the 
 
 81. Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 327, 367 n.176 (1998)  (assessing favorably the ethics committee’s reasoning). 
 82. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 83. E.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence of a Third Party’s Guilt of the Crime That 
the Accused Is Charged With:  The Constitutionalization of the SODDI (Some Other Dude 
Did It) Defense 2.0, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 91, 92 (2015). See generally Suni, supra note 14 
(compiling, analyzing, and critiquing the evidentiary rules and rules of professional conduct 
that restrict the use of the SODDI defense and arguing that courts should more readily permit 
defense counsel to engage in blame shifting). 
 84. Imwinkelried, supra note 83, at 99–102 (explaining that evidence of another party’s 
similar prior criminal acts rarely, though occasionally, is admissible).  
 85. Id. at 105. 
 86. See Suni, supra note 14, at 1658–59, 1658 nn.62–64.  To the extent that false 
defenses are rationalized by their role in protecting a defendant’s individual rights, this 
justification cannot account for the potential damage that blame shifting inflicts on the 
innocent third party, including potentially exposing that party to future criminal investigation 
or prosecution. Id. at 1658 & n.64; see also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the aim of protecting 
individual rights). 
 87. See Suni, supra note 14, at 1659. 
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proper functioning of the criminal justice system.88  Thus, for the purposes 
of this Note, perjury and the like are of minimal ethical interest. 
III.  MALUM IN SE?:  
RECENT RULINGS ON FALSE DEFENSES 
Bearing these tactics in mind, this part describes several recent federal 
cases that address whether defense attorneys knowingly may advance a 
false defense on behalf of a guilty client.  In two of these cases, United 
States v. Lauersen89 and United States v. Burnett,90 the courts held that false 
defenses are proscribed outright by state-law equivalents of the relevant 
ABA Model and Disciplinary Rules.91  In the third case, United States v. 
Jiménez-Bencevi,92 the First Circuit avoided grappling directly with the 
ethics of false defenses by circumventing for defense attorneys working on 
capital cases the knowledge requirement otherwise imposed by 
Massachusetts’s Rules of Professional Conduct.93  Finally, in Poventud v. 
City of New York,94 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
sitting en banc, split 9–6 regarding the propriety of false defenses in 
criminal trials.95 
A.  United States v. Lauersen 
In Lauersen, two codefendants were charged with committing health 
insurance fraud.96  At least one defendant, Magda Binion, elected to attend 
a pretrial proffer session with prosecutors during which she confessed her 
guilt in a sworn, written statement.97  Before offering her proffer statement, 
 
 88. Subin, supra note 6, at 126 & n.12, 145 n.91.  A particularly challenging case arises 
when a criminal defendant seeks to exercise his right to testify in his own defense and his 
attorney knows he intends to do so falsely.  This heavily debated scenario is beyond the 
scope of this Note; but for a useful introduction to the client perjury ethics literature, see 
generally Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing 
Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935 (2002). 
 89. No. 98CR1134 (WHP), 2000 WL 1693538 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000); see infra Part 
III.A. 
 90. No. 08-201-03, 2009 WL 2180373 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2009); see infra Part III.B. 
 91. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8; see also Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *4–
5; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). 
 92. 788 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 93. See infra Part III.C. 
 94. 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 95. See infra Part III.D. 
 96. See generally Indictment, Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538 (No. 98 CR 1134 (WHP)), 
2000 WL 35630186. 
 97. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *1.  Proffer sessions are a means by which 
some criminal defendants try to convince prosecutors to offer a guilty plea in exchange for a 
more lenient sentence.  A proffer is a written or oral statement made during a proffer session 
in which the defendant admits guilt, tells his side of the story, or provides other information 
that the prosecutor may find useful or compelling—for example, information that would 
make the defendant a valuable confidential informant. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Naftalis, Note, 
“Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal 
Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 6–8 (2003) (describing how, when, 
why, and under what legal conditions these proffers take place). 
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Binion signed a waiver permitting the government to use it “for the purpose 
of cross-examination should [the defendant] testify, or to rebut any 
evidence or arguments offered by or on behalf of [the defendant] . . . at any 
stage of the criminal prosecution.”98 
Binion and the prosecution presumably could not reach a plea agreement, 
and the case against her proceeded to trial.  Before the trial began, defense 
counsel moved the court to preclude the government from introducing 
Binion’s inculpatory proffer statement into evidence.99 
The parties argued over the enforceability of the waiver.100  In addition to 
arguing that the waiver enabled it to use Binion’s statement at trial, the 
government argued that the applicable rules of professional conduct 
prohibited Binion’s attorney from “adducing evidence of Binion’s ‘actual 
innocence’”101 because Binion’s statements during her proffer session left 
her attorney with no “good-faith basis”102 to argue she did not commit the 
crimes with which she had been charged.103  The government contended 
that ethics rules required Binion’s attorney to passively put the government 
to its proof or elicit evidence and argue points that did not conflict with 
Binion’s inadmissible admission of guilt.104 
The trial court denied in part and granted in part Binion’s motion.105  
While the court first found that the waiver was unenforceable,106 it 
nonetheless held that the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility107 precluded defense counsel from advancing at trial any 
proposition that contradicted Binion’s proffer statement.108  In so holding, 
the court summarily cited the rule of professional conduct that governed an 
attorney’s “[r]epresent[ation] [of] a [c]lient [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the 
 
 98. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *2. 
 99. Id. at *1. 
 100. Id. at *1, *4. 
 101. Id. at *5. 
 102. Id.; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The 
prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence 
is false.  A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation 
to the trier of fact.”); supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing the Model Rules’ 
definition of knowledge). 
 103. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *5. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *1. 
 106. See id. at *7 (finding that “the facts strongly suggest that Binion did not fully 
understand the potential consequences of the extent to which the Government could use her 
statements to ‘rebut’ evidence or arguments presented on her behalf” when she signed the 
waiver). 
 107. The New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, first enacted in 1970, 
was based on the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
also was adopted that year. Chris G. McDonough & Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attorney 
Conduct:  Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, 11 TOURO L. REV. 
609, 611 & n.7 (1995).  New York’s code was supplanted in 2009 by the current New York 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See N.Y. COMP CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009). 
 108. See Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8; cf. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 
(2013). 
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[l]aw.”109  Among other things, this rule forbade attorneys from knowingly 
using perjured testimony or false evidence,110 knowingly making a false 
statement of law or fact,111 “[p]articipat[ing] in the creation . . . of evidence 
when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false,”112 or 
“assist[ing] the client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or 
fraudulent.”113  The trial court reasoned that its “duty . . . to protect the 
integrity of the proceeding and to ensure that matters presented to the jury 
are grounded in good faith” compelled it to preclude Binion’s attorney from 
eliciting testimony from any witness or making any argument to the jury at 
any stage of Binion’s trial that “directly contradict[ed] specific factual 
statements made by Binion” in her proffer statement, unless Binion’s 
attorney had a “good-faith basis” for doing so.114  New York’s Disciplinary 
Rule 7-102, cited with a “see, e.g.,” signal, was the only authority offered in 
support of this holding.115 
The Lauersen court stressed the “integrity” of the criminal process in 
summarily holding that a defense attorney may not argue a client’s 
innocence if she knows the client is guilty.116  Under this reasoning, any 
knowingly false defense necessarily undermines the criminal process; and 
under the court’s one-sentence analysis of the ethical issues at play, this 
effect is undesirable and impermissible across the board.117 
B.  United States v. Burnett 
Nearly nine years after Lauersen, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
considered the same issue in Burnett.118  There, the defendant was charged 
with federal crimes arising from a series of robberies affecting interstate 
commerce.119  Like the defendant in Lauersen, the Burnett defendant made 
sworn, inculpatory proffer statements on two occasions, both of which were 
governed by a proffer agreement120 that the court later deemed 
unenforceable.121 
 
 109. N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (2007) (repealed 2009); see 
Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8. 
 110. N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4). 
 111. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5). 
 112. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6). 
 113. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). 
 114. Lauersen, 2000 WL 1693538, at *8. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. United States v. Burnett, No. 08-201-03, 2009 WL 2180373 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 
2009). 
 119. See id. at *1 (referring to “a series of Hobbs Act robberies”); see also, e.g., 5 DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 9, no. 2402 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining that the Hobbs Act “prohibits 
actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce”). 
 120. The proffer agreement provided, in pertinent part, 
if your client is a witness or party at any trial or other legal proceedings [sic] and 
testifies or makes representations through counsel materially different from 
statements made or information provided during the “off-the-record” proffer, the 
government may cross-examine your client, introduce rebuttal evidence and make 
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Like the court in Lauersen122—which the Burnet Court cited repeatedly 
in its ruling123—the Burnett Court then considered whether defense counsel 
ethically could advance at trial a proposition that contradicted the 
defendant’s sworn confession.124  Citing Pennsylvania’s equivalents of 
Model Rules 3.1, 3.3(a), and 3.4,125 the court held that “[a]bsent a good-
faith basis, within the operation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Mr. Burnett’s counsel may not present evidence or arguments on 
Mr. Burnett’s behalf that directly contradict the admissions made by Mr. 
Burnett during his proffer sessions.”126  As in Lauersen, the court offered 
no support or explanation for this holding beyond a quotation from and 
citation to the relevant ethics rules.127  Without anything further, the court 
seems to have taken for granted that a knowingly false defense necessarily 
constitutes unethical attorney conduct.128  Though the court expressed some 
sympathy as to the “frustration” its ruling might cause Burnett’s attorney as 
he attempted somehow to mount a zealous trial defense, the court 
nonetheless reasoned that lawyers often face difficult challenges and that 
“[s]killed lawyers . . . distinguish themselves—and will serve their clients—
precisely because they see the dilemma ahead of time and can try to make 
the best of the circumstances as presented.”129  The Burnett Court, then, 
read the Model Rules as proscribing false defenses of all kinds and warned 
defense counsel that the ethical attorney does not knowingly employ them. 
C.  United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi:  
When Judges Close Their Eyes to the Truth 
The First Circuit recently adopted a different approach to the false-
defense dilemma in Jiménez-Bencevi.130  The defendant in that case faced 
capital charges arising from a fatal shooting captured on surveillance 
 
representations based on statements made or information provided during the “off-
the-record” proffer. 
Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *1 (alteration in original).  
 121. See id. at *4.  
 122. See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *3–4. 
 124. See id. at *4–5. 
 125. 204 PA. CODE § 81.4, rr. 3.1, 3.3(a), 3.4 (2016); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT rr. 3.1, 3.3(a), 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 126. Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *5. 
 127. See id. 
 128. The court further noted that, in light of this holding, “it may well be in this instance 
that the defendant’s waiver through the proffer agreement would not have restricted counsel 
any more than he was already bound by the rules of professional conduct.” Id. at *5 n.6; see 
also supra note 120 (reproducing the relevant terms of Burnett’s proffer agreement).  The 
extent to which prosecutors should be able to use proffer agreements to limit a defendant’s 
trial defense is beyond the scope of this Note.  For an incisive treatment of the topic, see 
generally Naftalis, supra note 97.  Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing the Burnett Court’s 
suggestion that Rule 3.3 may ban knowingly false defenses just as thoroughly as if the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily had waived any right to present them. 
 129. Burnett, 2009 WL 2180373, at *5 n.6. 
 130. United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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video.131  Jiménez-Bencevi offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life 
sentence rather than facing the death penalty at trial.132  As a precondition 
to agreeing to accept a guilty plea, the prosecution required Jiménez-
Bencevi to make a sworn proffer statement admitting in detail his guilt of 
the crimes charged and also providing “any known information regarding 
other federal offenders.”133  Though Jiménez-Bencevi initially assented and 
made a proffer statement that included admissions of guilt, plea 
negotiations broke down, and the case proceeded to trial.134 
At trial, defense counsel sought to introduce the testimony of a forensic 
expert who had reviewed the surveillance footage of the killing.135  This 
expert—who did not know about Jiménez-Bencevi’s sworn confession—
planned to testify that in his opinion, the man seen on the video could not 
actually have been Jiménez-Bencevi.136  The prosecution objected and 
argued that the existence of Jiménez-Bencevi’s confession proved that his 
attorney knew that he was guilty and that defense counsel thus should not 
be permitted to call to the stand an expert whose opinion defense counsel 
knew was false.137 
The trial court responded by effectively precluding the defense from 
calling the expert witness.  It advised the defense that if the expert witness 
offered his (presumably mistaken) opinion, the court would reveal to the 
witness and jury the contradictory substance of Jiménez-Bencevi’s 
confession.138  The trial court explained that it “cannot in good conscience 
allow an expert who has not been made aware of the proffer to give an 
expert opinion on something where he’s missing evidence, he’s missing 
facts,” because it “would then be in a sense part and parcel to the giving of 
evidence that is not realistic or true.”139  When defense counsel later 
revisited the issue, the trial court stated that even if the expert stood by his 
opinion after learning of Jiménez-Bencevi’s admission, the court still would 
not allow Jiménez-Bencevi to “use an expert to give an imprimatur of 
expertise on something that [Jiménez-Bencevi] know[s] is totally false.”140 
On appeal, the First Circuit rejected this reasoning and reversed Jiménez-
Bencevi’s conviction.141  The appellate panel first examined the 
requirement, imposed by Model Rule 3.3(a), that attorneys not knowingly 
offer false evidence.142  The court noted that this rule applies only when an 
 
 131. Id. at 9–10. 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  The proffer statement was governed by a waiver agreement substantively 
identical for the purposes of this Note to the waiver agreements in Lauersen and Burnett. See 
supra note 98 and accompanying text (excerpting the waiver agreement in Laursen); supra 
note 120 (excerpting the waiver agreement in Burnett). 
 135. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 13. 
 136. See id. at 13–14. 
 137. Id. at 17–19. 
 138. Id. at 13–14. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 14 (alterations in original). 
 141. Id. at 20. 
 142. See supra Part I.B. 
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attorney actually knows that evidence is false:  mere belief, however strong, 
does not suffice.143  The First Circuit then broke with Lauersen and Burnett 
by concluding that the existence of Jiménez-Bencevi’s inculpatory proffer 
statement did not necessarily establish his guilt as an incontrovertible fact 
triggering Model Rule 3.3’s restriction.144  The panel found especially 
persuasive Jiménez-Bencevi’s knowledge that he would face the death 
penalty unless he convinced the prosecution to offer a lesser sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea.145  Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated 
admonishment that “death is different,”146 the court suggested that the mere 
existence of capital charges may so forcefully pressure defendants to do 
whatever they can to avoid execution as to call into question the veracity of 
capital defendants’ pretrial confessions.147 
The First Circuit went on to criticize and reject the trial court’s reluctance 
to set aside its presumed knowledge of Jiménez-Bencevi’s guilt when 
deciding whether to permit the defense’s forensic expert to testify.148  The 
district judge had reasoned, in a remark focused on the judge’s duty to 
conduct a trial that would uncover the truth,149 that he was bound by his 
“obligation to make certain that the facts that come out are as truthful as 
possible to the reality of the case.  I cannot close my eyes to that reality.  It 
would be improper, wrong for me to do that, and I will not allow that.”150  
The First Circuit found this reasoning deeply misguided.  It pointed out that 
evidentiary rules compel courts to “‘close their eyes’ to pertinent evidence 
all the time”151:  juries are not meant to learn or rely upon suppressed or 
unduly prejudicial evidence, for example, regardless of the evidence’s 
relevance.152  The Jiménez-Bencevi Court held that, despite its relevance, 
the defendant’s confession “for all intents and purposes[] did not exist”—
and the trial court was indeed obliged to “close [its] eye[s]” to the 
confession’s contents—unless the defendant contradicted his own 
confession on the witness stand.153  The trial court’s knowledge that the 
defendant had admitted guilt in a sworn statement thus did not alter its duty 
to conceal inadmissible evidence from the jury, and the statement ought not 
 
 143. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 18; see also supra note 39 (describing the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct’s definition of knowledge as actual knowledge only). 
 144. See Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 18–19 (explaining that Jiménez-Bencevi initially 
denied involvement in the crime; the credibility of the prosecution’s two eyewitnesses was 
questionable; the defense’s (ostensibly mistaken) forensic expert was a former FBI agent 
with twenty-five years’ experience; and that Jiménez-Bencevi was “desperate to avoid the 
death penalty and the government was adamant that it would not consider any plea 
agreement unless [he] admitted to all of the charges”).  In addition, the court noted that the 
forensic expert’s testimony would not have been dishonest, because his incorrect expert 
opinion was sincerely held. See id. 
 145. Id. at 17. 
 146. Id. at 17 n.5 (collecting Supreme Court cases invoking this aphorism). 
 147. See id. at 17–18, 17 n.5. 
 148. See id. at 19 n.7. 
 149. Cf. supra Part I.C.1. 
 150. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 19 n.7. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (discussing motions to suppress evidence and Federal Rule of Evidence 403). 
 153. Id. (second alteration in original). 
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have impacted the court’s evaluation of the defense’s attempt to elicit its 
forensic witness’s sincerely held expert opinion.154 
In Jiménez-Bencevi, the First Circuit chose not to confront directly 
whether a defense attorney’s ethical duties preclude her from knowingly 
advancing a false defense, instead limiting its holding to cases in which 
defense counsel has a good-faith basis to believe that her client may be 
innocent.155  But by giving voice to the tension in the false-defense context 
between truth seeking and protecting defendants’ rights, the Jiménez-
Bencevi panel’s admonition to the court below that defendants’ rights can—
and indeed, regularly do—outweigh the criminal process’s truth-seeking 
function bears directly on the false-defense dilemma.  At very least, the 
court’s underlying reasoning makes clear that judicial treatments of 
knowingly false defenses must engage with both of these systemic aims 
rather than simply presuming that the criminal process cannot abide defense 
tactics that require a court to close its eyes to inadmissible knowledge of a 
defendant’s guilt. 
D.  Poventud v. City of New York 
In Poventud, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the viability 
of a constitutional tort action against the City of New York and four New 
York City police officers.156  The procedural posture of this case is 
complex;157 many of the parties’ arguments and much of the en banc 
court’s opinions addressed technical aspects of constitutional tort 
doctrine.158  Underlying these arguments, however, was a disagreement as 
to the nature and propriety of false defenses.  Nine judges on the Second 
Circuit endorsed the notion that Brady violations during Poventud’s first 
prosecution undermined Poventud’s right to zealously defend himself, even 
though he later pled guilty to the charges.159  Six judges dissented, 
reasoning that Poventud’s guilty plea meant that he was actually guilty and 
asserting that a guilty defendant has no right to falsely defend himself at 
trial.160 
 
 154. See id. at 18–19, 19 n.7. 
 155. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 125–27 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 157. The case involved a vacated New York State criminal conviction; a plea deal 
whereby Poventud pled guilty to the original charges in exchange for a sentence of time 
served, enabling him to leave prison immediately; and a subsequent federal civil rights 
action alleging Brady violations during Poventud’s initial prosecution. See id. at 126–27 
(setting forth the case’s procedural history). 
 158. Specifically, the parties disagreed as to whether Poventud’s claims were barred by 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a Supreme Court case holding that the federal civil 
rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit actions at law that “necessarily have the 
effect of challenging [an] existing state or federal criminal conviction[],” unless the 
conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or “called into question by a 
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Poventud, 750 F.3d at 124.  The central 
issue addressed in Poventud was whether the defendant’s guilty plea prevented him from 
satisfying this doctrinal requirement. See id. 
 159. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 160. See infra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
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Judge Richard C. Wesley authored the majority opinion.161  Of particular 
relevance, he noted, in dicta discussing the trial court’s ruling, that the court 
below 
incorrectly presume[d] that . . . the State could violate Poventud’s Brady 
rights only if Poventud is an innocent man. . . .  In this case, Poventud has 
the right to argue to the jury that with the main State witness impeached, 
he would have been acquitted based on reasonable doubt or convicted on 
a lesser charge.162 
Similarly, in a concurring opinion in which all nine judges in the majority 
joined, Judge Raymond J. Lohier contrasted the notion that Poventud did 
not actually commit the crime with his legal entitlement to be provided any 
evidence that “would have tended to lead to a verdict of not guilty” of the 
conduct to which Poventud later confessed.163  In finding that Poventud had 
a right to contest facts the truth of which he later conceded by pleading 
guilty, the Poventud majority recognized a right to mount a false defense, at 
least under certain circumstances. 
The panel’s six dissenters adopted a contrary view, rejecting any right to 
mount a false defense and instead characterizing this purported right as a 
right to commit perjury.  In an opinion joined by all but one dissenter, 
Judge Dennis Jacobs noted that “the undisclosed evidence here could only 
have been useful to Poventud in one very particular way—to support an 
inference that Poventud was elsewhere at the time of the crime.  [However,] 
Poventud has now solemnly admitted that this inference is wholly false.”164  
Judge Jacobs argued that the majority’s holding wrongfully undermined 
truth seeking by allowing Poventud to seek damages for nondisclosure of 
“evidence [that] would have been helpful only to strengthen [a] perjurious 
alibi.”165  On this view, 
[a criminal defendant] cannot have it both ways:  he cannot state that he is 
guilty, that he was present on the day in question and participated in the 
crime, but that he was nonetheless prejudiced at his trial by the 
nondisclosure of evidence that could have helped him only by suggesting 
that the accurate testimony of the victim should not be believed.166 
In another opinion also joined by all but one dissenter, Judge Debra Ann 
Livingston adroitly summarized this rejection of false defenses, criticizing 
the majority’s holding as recognizing a “right to recompense for a denial of 
the opportunity to commit perjury more successfully.”167  In Judge 
Livingston’s estimation, Poventud’s claim failed precisely because “the 
undisclosed evidence could only have helped him falsely deny” his guilt.168  
 
 161. Poventud, 750 F.3d at 124–38. 
 162. Id. at 134–35. 
 163. Id. at 147 (Lohier, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 155. 
 166. Id. at 157.  
 167. Id. at 165 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 168. 
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This pejorative language unmistakably conveys the dissenters’ view that the 
courts should not permit such an outcome. 
E.  Lessons Learned 
With the exception of the majority decision and concurrences in 
Poventud,169 these four cases convey judicial discomfort with the notion 
that the trial process might have a legitimate purpose contrary to truth 
seeking.  In effect, these opinions—excepting those authored by judges in 
the Poventud majority—hold that the Model Rules impose severe tactical 
restrictions on an attorney knowingly representing a guilty client and 
suggest that an attorney in this position can do little more than passively put 
the government to its proof.  These cases’ scarce analyses indicate a lack of 
recognition of the variety of false defense tactics, adopting instead an all-or-
nothing approach to the false-defense dilemma and, in so doing, revealing 
superficial understandings of the professional conduct rules on which their 
conclusions are based.170 
IV.  FALSE DEFENSES IN CONTEXT(S) 
This part aims to build and improve upon the Lauersen, Burnett, 
Jiménez-Bencevi, and Poventud Courts’ wanting analyses of false-defense 
tactics171 by evaluating the variety of procedural circumstances in which 
false defenses occur.  It begins by considering the two ends of the ethical 
spectrum of false-defense tactics, namely, putting the government to its 
proof and knowingly eliciting or suborning false material testimony.  This 
part then turns to more challenging scenarios in which the ethics of 
different types of false defenses are less clear.  Rather than focusing strictly 
on philosophical or theoretical concerns, this part emphasizes practical 
ethical consequences of judges proscribing or permitting different false 
defenses.  This part then offers context-specific recommendations to 
attorneys and judges about when and how to implement, allow, or forbid 
them. 
This part concludes that defense counsel’s dueling ethical roles and the 
adversary process’s competing aims172 are best balanced by drawing a 
distinction between false defenses arising from evidence known by defense 
counsel to be false and false defenses involving false legal arguments.  By 
differentiating false evidence from false arguments, this part offers a more 
nuanced approach to false defenses that comports with the ethical 
requirements imposed by the Model Rules173 and affords workable, 
practical guidance to courts and practitioners alike. 
 
 169. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 108–15, 125–28 and accompanying text; supra Part III.D. 
 171. See supra Part III. 
 172. See supra Part I. 
 173. See supra Part I.A. 
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The Model Rules forbid knowingly introducing false lay or expert 
testimony.174  However, false defense tactics that involve factually accurate 
testimony175 or false legal arguments176 do not violate the Model Rules, and 
they advance the adversary process’s aim of safeguarding defendants’ 
individual rights.  This part, therefore, concludes that courts should permit 
the latter category of false defenses.  Though parsing permissible from 
impermissible false defense tactics is challenging in certain scenarios, 
courts and practitioners should embrace these varieties of false defenses as 
ethical forms of zealous advocacy. 
A.  The Easy Boundary Cases 
First, as set forth above,177 judges and ethicists agree that defense 
attorneys always may submit to the fact-finder that the government has 
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, even on behalf of an 
indisputably guilty client.178  This must be so to safeguard defendants’ 
individual rights by reifying the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  It is not seriously disputed that courts should permit 
defense counsel to engage in this tactic, which commonly amounts to the 
minimum form of zealous representation required by Model Rule 1.3.179 
Second, knowingly eliciting or suborning false material testimony is 
forbidden by both criminal statutes180 and the Model Rules:  it is clear that a 
defense attorney never is permitted to resort to such tactics.181  It is 
important again to note that this prohibition serves to prevent the fact-finder 
from being influenced by false evidence, as opposed to false arguments 
drawn from evidence not known by defense counsel to be untrue. 
 
 174. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 175. See infra notes 185–90 and accompanying text. 
 176. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 177. See supra Part II.A. 
 178. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 52, at 1064 (“The defendant . . . is presumed 
innocent, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
even the guilty accused has an ‘absolute constitutional right to remain silent’ and to put the 
government to its proof.” (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964))); 
Henning, supra note 63, at 271 (“It is universally accepted that the defense lawyer can put 
the government to its proof—a process that could well result in a not-guilty verdict if a 
crucial witness fails to appear or testifies poorly or if important physical evidence is 
unavailable.”); see also supra Part III.A. 
 179. See supra Part II.A (introducing the tactic of putting the government to its proof); 
see also supra Part I.A.1. (introducing Model Rule 1.3 and its requirements).  
 180. See 5 DEP’T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 119, tit. 9, no. 1752 (describing the 
elements of the crime of subornation of perjury and citing relevant case law and rules of 
professional conduct); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); 
Subin, supra note 6, at 126 & n.12. But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27–42 (1st ed. 1975) (arguing that defense attorneys should be 
permitted knowingly to call to testify on their own behalf defendants who intend to commit 
perjury). 
 181. See supra Part III.E. 
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B.  Shades of Gray:  False Defenses in Specific Contexts 
Having established these clear cases, this section delves into false-
defense tactics that require more nuanced legal, ethical, and policy analysis.  
In so doing, this section first considers false defenses bearing on the 
evidence presented at trial and then examines false defenses advanced 
through arguments made by defense counsel to the jury.  It concludes that 
the Model Rules forbid tactics grounded in false evidence, which 
undermine the trial process’s truth-seeking function without safeguarding 
defendants’ individual rights.  Tactics that rely on false arguments, 
however, fall within the Model Rules and advance defendants’ individual 
rights without distorting the factual material parsed by the jury as it seeks to 
arrive at the truth.  For this reason, courts should prohibit false-defense 
tactics that knowingly rely upon false evidence and permit tactics 
knowingly advanced through false arguments. 
1.  False Defenses Arising from False Evidence 
This subsection considers false defenses that may result in false, 
inaccurate, irrelevant, or misleading facts being presented to the jury.  It 
first discusses direct examination of lay witnesses182 and then discusses 
direct examination of expert witnesses.  It concludes that the Model Rules 
prohibit defense counsel from knowingly eliciting factually inaccurate lay 
testimony; but they permit defense counsel to elicit lay testimony not 
known to be false, even if doing so undermines the adversary system’s goal 
to arrive at the truth. 
i.  Lay Witnesses on Direct Examination 
There are two types of lay witnesses whose testimony defense counsel 
may use to advance an evidentiary false defense:  a witness whose 
testimony is sincere but incorrect, and a witness whose testimony is sincere 
and correct but may be used to support a falsehood. 
First, the sincere but incorrect lay witness earnestly believes a falsehood 
to which he intends to testify in court.  Such a witness may appear enticing 
to a guilty defendant eager to benefit from the witness’s favorable, 
nonperjurious testimony.  Unfortunately for the guilty defendant, however, 
his attorney cannot elicit this testimony without running afoul of a clear-cut 
ethical restriction.  Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) forbids attorneys from offering 
 
 182. This subsection discusses direct examination.  Regarding cross-examination, 
commentators and courts universally agree that defense attorneys may seek to impeach and 
undermine the credibility of witnesses who defense counsel know are testifying truthfully. 
See Suni, supra note 14, at 1657–58, 1658 n.61; see also supra note 69 and accompanying 
text (introducing the dogged cross-examination of a truthful witness as an instance of 
drawing false inferences).  Indeed, defense counsel likely must subject truthful witnesses to 
dogged cross-examination to meet the duty of zealous advocacy. See supra Part I.A.1.  
While doing so obfuscates the truth, it commonly is considered a necessary part of zealously 
putting the government to its proof. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  Courts 
should continue to permit this widespread practice, which merits minimal discussion here. 
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any “evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”183  This rule does not 
distinguish sincere from insincere testimony.184  An attorney who knows 
that a witness would testify to a falsehood therefore ethically may not elicit 
or rely upon that false testimony.  A judge should not hesitate to read the 
plain language of Model Rule 3.3 as forbidding defense counsel from 
engaging in this tactic. 
Eliciting a sincere but incorrect lay witness’s testimony clearly impedes 
the adversary process’s truth-seeking function, as defense counsel 
knowingly calls such a witness in an effort to convince the jury of a false 
proposition.  Further, a defendant can point to no individual right advanced 
by engaging in this tactic:  our system does not afford criminal defendants a 
legal or constitutional right to disprove the prosecution’s case by lying to 
the jury.  Using sincere but incorrect lay testimony to defend against a 
criminal charge therefore serves no legitimate function relative to either of 
these systemic aims. 
Second, defense counsel may seek to use sincere and correct lay witness 
testimony to knowingly support a false proposition.  Such a witness appeals 
to the guilty defendant for the same reason as the sincere but incorrect one:  
the witness’s testimony again is earnest, nonperjurious, and bolsters the 
defense’s case.  Such testimony does not run afoul of Model Rule 3.3, 
because no false evidence is submitted to the court.  Perhaps for this reason, 
courts that have addressed this scenario widely have agreed with the 
conclusion reached in Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164185 that the Model 
Rules permit attorneys to introduce truthful testimony even if that testimony 
may be used to support a false proposition.186  So long as the witness’s 
testimony comports with evidentiary rules governing relevance, unfair 
prejudice, confusion, and the like,187 judges should adhere to the Michigan 
ethics committee’s reminder that there is no ethical proscription against 
suborning truthful testimony.188 
The Model Rules thus impose no restriction on defense counsel calling a 
lay witness to offer testimony that is both sincere and factually accurate.  
Although this strategy, if successful, may impede truth seeking, it is a 
means by which a defendant may exercise his individual right to a zealous 
defense.  Viewed through this lens, the Michigan ethics committee’s 
 
 183. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(applying with approval the holding of Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164). 
 187. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (relevance); id. 403 (unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of 
time); id. 404(a)(1) (character evidence); id. 404(b)(1) (evidence of prior bad acts). 
 188. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.  It also is worth noting that a witness 
who intentionally offers literally true but misleading testimony may commit obstruction of 
justice.  The Ninth Circuit famously addressed this dynamic in the U.S. government’s 
prosecution of baseball star Barry Bonds for allegedly evasive testimony about his alleged 
steroid use. See United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[M]isleading 
or evasive testimony that is factually true can obstruct justice.”), rev’d on other grounds, 784 
F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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conclusion that “[o]ne cannot suborn the truth”189 recognizes that the 
adversary system protects this individual right by widely permitting 
defenses based on truthful evidence rather than attempting to permit certain 
types of truthful evidence but forbid others. In short, defendants’ rights 
outweigh truth seeking in this context.190 
ii.  Expert Witnesses on Direct Examination 
This Note now turns to defense counsel’s treatment of expert witnesses 
on direct examination. 
a.  The Sincere but Incorrect Expert Witness 
Unlike the straightforward ethical challenge inherent to lay witness 
testimony, expert witnesses can pose more challenging scenarios, because 
an expert’s testimony can be understood either as new evidence or as an 
opinion derived from the information provided to the expert.  This 
characterization makes the application of Model Rule 3.3 to expert 
testimony less clear. 
Consider an expert witness unaware of a defendant’s guilt.  Should a trial 
court insist that this expert be made aware that the defendant is guilty?191  
Expert witnesses testify merely to their opinion formed based on the 
evidence and information provided to them, and an expert does not 
necessarily testify directly to the truth or falsity of a disputed proposition.192  
This unique evidentiary function193 may justify defense counsel furnishing 
an expert only with information relevant to the expert’s inquiry.194  Defense 
counsel then may allow the expert to draw his or her own independent 
conclusions from that information—as the First Circuit directed in Jiménez-
 
 189. Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-1164 (1987). 
 190. See, e.g., id. 
 191. See, e.g., supra Part III.C (describing the dilemma parsed by the courts in Jiménez-
Bencevi). 
 192. See, e.g., Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal 
Rules, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 239, 251–56 (2015) (distinguishing between “participating expert,” 
“original knowledge expert,” and “assumption expert” witnesses and describing the nature of 
their testimony). But see, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 
1140 (characterizing “[t]he major function of experts” as “to create new evidence in the 
form of expert opinions”). 
 193. Gross, supra note 192, at 1140 (“This is a unique feature of expert testimony—there 
is no other context in which a witness can create new evidence about past events—and it 
gives the expert witness a set of options that no other witness has.”). 
 194. Note that a defendant’s confession presumably is not relevant to an expert charged 
with drawing conclusions from objective evidence.  For example, an expert comparing a 
defendant’s fingerprint to a fingerprint collected from a crime scene should reach the same 
conclusion whether or not that defendant has admitted guilt.  Applying this principle to 
Jiménez-Bencevi, the forensic expert in that case simply investigated whether a surveillance 
video in fact depicted the defendant:  that video’s contents did not change when 
Jiménez-Bencevi proffered his guilt to prosecutors before trial. See supra notes 131–36 and 
accompanying text. 
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Bencevi when it instructed the trial court to “close its eyes” to the 
defendant’s inadmissible confession of guilt.195 
Further, the unique role of the expert witness may mean that an attorney 
who knowingly elicits an expert’s false opinion does not violate Model 
Rule 3.3.  Because an expert does not speak dishonestly by stating an 
earnestly held opinion, defense counsel arguably does not elicit false 
testimony by putting a sincere expert on the stand.196  However, the unique 
authority vested in expert witnesses militates against permitting defense 
counsel to knowingly induce them to testify to false conclusions, because a 
witness vested with expert authority generally is more likely to convince a 
jury of his factually inaccurate opinion.197 
Whether a court should permit defense counsel knowingly to elicit the 
testimony of a sincere but incorrect expert witness ultimately turns on 
whether the court views expert opinions as more like a lay witness’s 
testimony—permitted if the testimony is sincere and accurate198—or more 
like other evidence—impermissible if the attorney knows it to be false.199 
In practice, this distinction might turn in part on the precise way in which 
an expert witness presents his or her conclusions to the jury.  For example, 
if an attorney knows her client is guilty, Model Rule 3.3 prohibits her from 
inducing a witness to attest inaccurately to the client’s innocence per se, 
even if the witness’s testimony is sincere.200  This proscription applies to 
expert and lay witnesses in equal measure.201  Thus, defense counsel 
ethically cannot induce an expert witness to, for example, state that “the 
defendant is not the man in the video” if the attorney knows to the contrary.  
Alternatively, an expert might state, “in my opinion, the defendant is not the 
man in the video”; but if defense counsel knows the expert’s opinion is 
incorrect, a truth-seeking judge202 may be disinclined to permit even this 
qualified testimony.  In these scenarios, Model Rule 3.3’s proscription 
against submitting false evidence controls.203 
But what if an expert witnesses opines, for example, that “based on the 
information provided to me, the man in the video is approximately six 
inches taller than the defendant”?  By adding this clause, the expert now has 
testified sincerely and accurately without making any statement that the 
 
 195. United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 19 n.7 (1st Cir. 2015); see also supra 
Part III.C. 
 196. See, e.g., Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 19 (concluding that because the defense 
expert’s opinion was sincerely held, defense counsel should be permitted to present and cast 
as reliable to the jury the expert’s (presumably) factually incorrect testimony). 
 197. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony:  Back to the Future, 
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (1995) (“[Their role and authority] make experts important 
witnesses in every case.  The extensive testifying experience of many experts makes them 
not only powerful, but also persuasive witnesses, capable of making or destroying a case.”). 
 198. See supra Part IV.B.1.i (discussing false defense tactics arising from lay witness 
testimony). 
 199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 200. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra Part II.A. 
 203. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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attorney knows to be false (provided that defense counsel furnished the 
expert with all relevant information at her disposal).204  Yet the practical 
impact of the expert’s testimony on the fact-finder may be the same no 
matter which clause precedes the witness’s conclusion.  From one 
perspective, defense counsel has violated the spirit of Model Rule 3.3 
through an artful turn of phrase unlikely to lessen the force of her expert’s 
testimony.  From a different view, courts may hesitate to prevent defense 
counsel from introducing testimony that, like the alibi witness discussed in 
Michigan ethics opinion CI-1164,205 is neither false nor misleading on its 
own terms, even if that testimony impedes the jury from arriving at the 
truth.206 
On balance, the approach charted by the First Circuit in Jiménez-Bencevi 
is persuasive.207  So long as an expert is aware of all relevant information, a 
court that “closes its eyes” to inadmissible evidence best ensures that the 
criminal process functions fairly and properly.208  If nothing else, regardless 
of its conclusion, a court faced with this dilemma should carefully and 
thoughtfully consider the issues brought to the fore by the Jiménez-Bencevi 
Panel and seek to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the lower court in that 
case when it simply rejected the expert’s testimony out of hand.209 
b.  The Sincere and Correct Expert Witness 
Whose Testimony Supports a Falsehood 
Another related and thorny issue arises when an attorney knowingly 
introduces an expert witness’s sincere and accurate opinion, supporting a 
truthful proposition, to bolster a falsehood through subsequent legal 
argument.210  A skillful advocate able to extract a carefully circumscribed 
expert opinion could generate expert testimony that is neither untruthful nor 
factually inaccurate and then, for example, knowingly draw a false 
inference from that testimony in hopes of securing an acquittal.  In Jiménez-
Bencevi, for instance, defense counsel could have induced a forensic expert 
to testify that, based on the information at the expert’s disposal, the man on 
the surveillance video was taller than the defendant.  Rather than simply 
using this testimony to point out weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, the 
attorney then could have relied on this testimony to affirmatively and 
falsely argue actual innocence or shift blame onto an innocent third party. 
Such tactics again present a close question.  Standing alone, each of these 
steps could be deemed ethically permissible; but in combination they may 
mislead the fact-finder in the very ways that the Model Rules strive to 
prevent.  When false-defense tactics compound to create new, misleading 
evidence, courts should prohibit the practice.  By way of illustration, 
 
 204. See supra note 194 (discussing what constitutes relevant information in this context). 
 205. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 189–90. 
 207. See supra note 204. 
 208. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text. 
 210. For analysis of false defenses made through legal arguments, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
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defense counsel in Jiménez-Bencevi would not be permitted to call an 
expert to testify—sincerely but inaccurately—that, in the expert’s opinion 
based on the information provided to him, the man on the surveillance 
video was the defendant’s brother—and then affirmatively argue that the 
brother committed the crime.211  Here, the defense attorney does not merely 
use the expert’s testimony to emphasize ways in which the jury may have 
reasonable doubt.  Instead, she advances the expert’s opinion as though it 
were true despite knowing of its falsity, violating Model Rule 3.3 by 
knowingly submitting false evidence to the court.212  This tactic clearly 
undermines truth seeking, and because a defendant has no right to defend 
himself by lying to the jury, it does not implicate the adversary system’s 
function to safeguard individual rights. 
Courts thus should permit defense counsel to put the government to its 
proof by highlighting deficiencies in the prosecution’s case;213 but they 
should seek to draw the line where attorneys knowingly generate favorable 
false testimony to employ that testimony as a sword against the prosecution, 
rather than a shield. 
2.  False Defenses Arising from Legal Arguments 
Having evaluated tactics trafficking in evidence, this subsection turns to 
false defenses that involve legal arguments knowingly advancing or 
suggesting false propositions.214  Consider first the tactic of drawing false 
inferences.215  Scholars have parsed false inferences into two types:  those 
advanced to make plain the prosecution’s failure to prove its case and those 
advanced for their purported factual accuracy.216  False inferences of the 
former kind properly are understood as a necessary extension of every 
defendant’s right to put the government to its proof.217  From this 
perspective, if defense counsel always may argue the government has not 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, then she always should be 
permitted to point to the specific reasons why this is so, even when she 
knows her client is guilty.  This conclusion follows both logically and also 
in light of the narrative approach that juries commonly follow during 
deliberations.218  Because the side presenting the more compelling story is 
more likely to prevail,219 prohibiting defense counsel from drawing false 
 
 211. Such an argument would constitute what Professor Imwinkelried labels the “SODDI 
Defense 2.0.” See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 83. 
 212. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.1. 
 213. See supra Part II.A. 
 214. A defense attorney presents legal arguments during summation.  She also may 
convey the substance of an argument through the tone and content of questions posed to 
witnesses on direct and cross-examination.  For an example of the relevance and potential 
effect of an advocate’s specific language and tone in this context, see Subin, Is This Lie 
Necessary?, supra note 50, at 692. 
 215. See supra Part II.B. 
 216. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 71. 
 219. See supra note 71. 
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inferences from properly introduced evidence—in other words, preventing 
the defense from making plain to the jury specific ways in which the 
prosecution has not overcome reasonable doubt—disadvantages the defense 
by lowering the high probative hurdle otherwise placed before the 
prosecution in every criminal case.  False inferences of this type obfuscate 
the truth in the case of the guilty client, but their importance to the 
adversary process’s function to safeguard individual rights militates 
strongly in favor of permitting defense counsel to advance them in court. 
Returning to the practical realm, this form of false inference also should 
not be read to run afoul of the Model Rules.  For one, the lack of 
disciplinary proceedings brought as a result of this tactic evidences that it 
falls within “conventional professional understandings” of ethical attorney 
conduct.220  In addition, the procedurally distinct function of an attorney’s 
legal arguments to the jury supports the notion that “a criminal defense 
lawyer’s jury summation arguing for the acquittal of a client whom he 
knows to be guilty . . . [should] be viewed as [an] assertion[] of the client’s 
legal position or of conclusions that arguably should be drawn from the 
facts put before the court,”221 rather than as “false statement[s] of fact or 
law” prohibited by Model Rule 3.3.222 
Some false inferences of the second type—those advanced for their 
purported truth223—stand on shakier ethical ground and may be more 
difficult to identify in practice.  Dogged cross-examination of witnesses 
known to be truthful is a widely accepted practice.224  But without taking 
care to ground her comments in the evidence, defense counsel’s conduct 
may elide into simply making false statements in violation of Model Rule 
3.3.225  Here, the connection between the defense attorney’s inference and 
the evidence is thin:  the attorney no longer infers from the evidence as 
much as attempts to convince the jury of a falsehood not supported by the 
evidence.  Courts should intervene when defense attorneys simply may be 
peddling unsupported falsehoods to the jury.226  But so long as an 
attorney’s assertions remain grounded in the evidence, a court should 
permit defense counsel to defend a guilty client by advancing false 
inferences that serve to lay bare weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. 
 
 220. See Green, supra note 81, at 367–69 (arguing that, to the extent that criminal 
obstruction of justice statutes may suggest otherwise, those statutes reflect neither the rules 
governing attorney conduct nor what Green describes as “the lore of the profession”). 
 221. Id. 
 222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also Green, 
supra note 81, at 369; Suni, supra note 14, at 1662–63, 1663 n.91 (advising that false 
inferences in this context “do[] not appear to rise to the level of a Rule 3.3 violation,” and 
arguing that false inferences of this type do not run afoul of the defense advocate’s duty to 
refrain from dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative conduct as an officer of the 
court). 
 223. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 182. 
 225. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing defense attorneys’ duty to serve as officers of the 
court). 
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The same distinction between a false defense advanced to rebut the 
prosecution’s evidence and one offensively advanced for its purported 
truthfulness227 applies to the tactic of arguing a guilty client’s actual 
innocence.  If defense counsel’s argument arises from the admitted 
evidence, courts should apply the same logic set forth above with respect to 
false inferences228 to differentiate a legal argument from the types of false 
statement proscribed by Model Rule 3.3.229  A permissible actual innocence 
defense of this type identifies particular facts adduced at trial and constructs 
from them a plausible narrative in which the defendant did not commit the 
crime.  Professor Bruce A. Green’s suggestion that arguments of this type 
are best characterized as legal positions rather than statements of fact230 is 
as compelling in this context as in the case of false inferences.  Simply put, 
attorneys and judges should view both tactics as permissible means of 
actively putting the government to its proof.231 
Unlike the other false defense tactics this Note considers, blame shifting 
in the case of a guilty client deliberately implicates an innocent third party 
in criminal activity.  This undercuts potential justifications of the tactic 
focused on values like advancing defendants’ dignity and autonomy or 
inspiring confidence in the criminal process:  a defense attorney who uses 
this tactic simply shifts the harms caused by a criminal prosecution from a 
guilty client onto someone who does not deserve them.232  Several scholars 
have advanced this concern—although others more focused on “the strength 
of the systemic justifications for aggressive advocacy” would shift blame 
from a guilty client without compunction.233  In her article devoted to the 
blame-shifting tactic, Professor Suni explains that, while reasonable minds 
have differed regarding shifting blame from a guilty client, the rules of 
professional conduct seem not to prohibit doing so.234  This Note endorses 
Suni’s well-reasoned conclusion that blame shifting falls within the bounds 
of permissible zealous advocacy and that courts therefore should permit this 
practice.235 
CONCLUSION 
This Note seeks to contextualize and synthesize the vibrant discourse 
surrounding false defenses in order to offer concrete guidance to courts and 
lawyers considering whether, when, why, and how attorneys should be 
permitted to zealously defend guilty clients.  In so doing, this Note aims to 
improve upon the approach taken by courts that have treated false defenses 
 
 227. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 215–26 and accompanying text. 
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as a monolithic category to be accepted or rejected in one fell swoop.236  
Instead, following Jiménez-Bencevi’s237 and the Poventud majority’s238 
lead, this Note strives to account for important differences among the 
variety of tactics available to a defense attorney charged with knowingly 
representing a guilty client.  This accounting reveals that false defenses 
knowingly advanced through false evidence impede truth seeking without 
advancing legitimate individual rights.  The Model Rules thus prohibit 
defense counsel from knowingly eliciting false testimony from a lay or 
expert witness, whether or not that testimony is sincere.  The case of a 
sincere and accurate expert witness whose testimony may be used to 
support a falsehood presents a difficult question, but courts should permit 
this tactic so long as defense counsel uses the expert’s opinion merely to 
emphasize weaknesses in the prosecution’s case rather than knowingly 
treating the expert’s opinion as though it were new evidence that supports a 
false proposition. 
The Model Rules’ restriction against introducing false evidence does not 
apply to false defenses advanced through legal arguments.  Defense counsel 
advances the adversary system’s rights-protecting function by using a false 
legal argument to highlight a deficiency in the prosecution’s case.  For this 
reason, this Note concludes that courts generally should embrace the tactics 
of drawing false inferences, arguing actual innocence, and shifting blame as 
instances of ethical—albeit dishonest—zealous advocacy, even though 
these tactics impede truth seeking at trial. 
Finally, this Note also strives to contribute much-needed depth and 
perspective to real-world approaches to false defenses in the courts.  The 
constraints within which defense counsel representing a guilty client ought 
to work will become clearer only through incisive, nuanced, and well-
reasoned judicial interpretations of the boundaries delimiting ethical from 
unethical false-defense tactics.  Courts and practitioners hopefully will 
delve more deeply into the ethics of different false defenses as the scenarios 
this Note describes continue to arise in practice. 
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